

Full Length Research

Breaking the Migration-Radicalisation myth : A de-radicalisation Process of youth among the Somali Migrants in Eastleigh, Nairobi, Kenya

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The paper takes the view that there is a profound relationship between migration and the radicalization process of society. Migration is not necessarily bad but if conducted in an orderly manner could lead to an economic boom. The objective is to study the contribution the youth make to economic development to dissuade them from radicalization that leads to terror activities. We argue that when the youth are occupied in an economic generating activity they have little time for radicalization leading to terrorist activities. The fear by western countries not to allow a flow of migrants to their home countries is uncalled for. While it is true that terrorists can take advantage of the good will of host nation to cause terror, the good outweighs the bad. We use empirical data from Somali migrants in Nairobi, Kenya to show the positive net contributions to job creation, employment and economic growth of the host country, Kenya.

Keywords: Migration, Radicalisation, de-radicalisation, Somali Migrants, Kenya

INTRODUCTION

Radicalization of youth has emerged as the response to the global crisis of migration. Radicalization is no longer akin to religion but that given the experiences of each community its people can be radicalized. The recent migrations across Africa, Europe, Asia, Latin America, USA and Canada show that people can be radicalized by their own society when their space is invaded by migrants or refugees. The failure to listen to the complaints of the local community, can easily lay the fertile breeding ground for extremism and terrorist activities as a way of passing a strong message to the state. However, from the data available one can argue that there are communities which have embarked on anti radicalization process. One of the factors has been to promote coexistence with those considered as

foreigners within their midst.

International migration is no longer a myth but a reality that no nation in the world can resist allowing in migrants. Improved technology in the transport sector has made movement easier, cheaper and faster for people to move in search of job, opportunities, education and enjoy quality of life of their choice.

Part of the reason for migration has been pull and push factors like conflict, poverty, inequality and a lack of sustainable livelihoods. These conditions compel people to leave their homes in search of a better future for themselves and their families abroad. The IOM recognizes this need and advises that with appropriate policies, migration can contribute positively to the country's sustainable economic growth and improved household development to host communities

and to their countries of birth. The World Bank Report 2017 estimates that migrants from developing countries sent home an estimated US \$413 billion in remittances in 2016.

Remittances constitute a significant source of household income that improves the livelihoods of families and communities through investments in education, health, sanitation, housing and infrastructure. Countries of destination benefit significantly from migration as migrants often fill critical labour gaps, create jobs as entrepreneurs, and pay taxes and social security contributions. Some migrants are among the most dynamic members of the host society contributing to the development of science and technology and enriching their host communities by providing cultural diversity. On 19 September 2016, the General Assembly adopted the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants calling for the development of two global compacts in 2018. The Declaration agreed to a set of commitments that apply to both refugees and other migrants, as well as separate sets of commitments for refugees and for other migrants. The EU official updates 2018 on migrants entering Europe estimates that over 2 million migrants and refugees entered the EU Countries. The BBC 2018 updates indicated that of these 2 million over 919,000 Syrians who entered the EU between between 2014 and 2017 (BBC September 11, 2018). The IOM 2017 annual report gives the following statistics on international migrants worldwide. The report shows that human beings by nature are migrants. The global migration has grown rapidly in recent years. By 2017 it had reached 258 million in up from 220 million in 2010 and 173 million in 2000. The IOM report estimates that over 60 per cent of all international migrants are found in Asia at 80 million and Europe at 78 million. Northern America hosted the third largest number of international migrants at 58 million, followed by Africa (25 million), Latin America and the Caribbean (10 million) and Oceania (8 million). By 2017, Germany and the Russian Federation hosted the second, third and fourth largest numbers of migrants worldwide with 12 million each. Great Britain hosted over 9 million migrants. In 2017, two thirds (67 per cent) of all international migrants were living in just twenty countries. The largest number of international migrants (50 million) resided in the United States of America. From the gender perspective, women migrants comprised 48% of all international migrants. Female migrants outnumber male migrants in Europe. Of interest to this study is the age of the migrants. In 2017, the median age of international migrants worldwide was 39 years, a slight increase from 38 years in 2000. Yet in some regions, the migrant population is becoming younger. It means that most of the migrant population moving into different parts of the world are the youth. The IOM report 2017 argued that migration should not be seen as a negative process

but positive contribution to the work force and population growth in countries where population was dropping. For instance between 2000 and 2015, positive net migration contributed to Europe's population stability at 2% instead of 1%.

Despite the significant benefits of migration, some migrants remain among the most vulnerable members of society. Migrants are often the first to lose their jobs in the event of an economic downturn. Some work for less pay, for longer hours, and in worse conditions than native-born workers. While migration is often an empowering experience, some migrants endure human rights violations, abuse and discrimination. Migrants, particularly women and children, may fall victim to human trafficking and the heinous forms of exploitation that it entails.

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, with its commitment to leave no one behind, recognises that international migration is of major relevance for the development of countries of origin, transit and destination, requiring coherent and comprehensive responses. In the Agenda, Governments pledged to "facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies" (SDG target 10.7). The 2030 Agenda also seeks to reduce remittance transfer fees, to promote labour standards for migrant workers, and to eliminate human trafficking.

Therefore, four arguments are generated by this paper. The first examines the relation between migration and radicalization triggered by the pull and push factors. The Somali Community of Eastleigh, Nairobi, have turned around this once a silent residential area once dominated by the Goan Indians and the middle class of Kenya to a great economic hub in the suburbs of the city. Carrier (...) book gave it the title, *The Little Mogadishu: Eastleigh, Nairobi's Global Hub*. Secondly, to understand different ways radicalization could be controlled from the Somali Family perspective. Despite being Muslims, the youth have been assisted to think economically about their future and spend less time on radicalization. The paper can prove that religion per se does not necessarily cause radicalization leading to extremism and terrorist activities. The Somali community of Eastleigh has developed simple models of educating the youth to handle push and pull factors from the synthesis of political ideologies, socioeconomic opportunities, combined with self employment opportunities, inculcating strong family values, tolerance, acceptability in society and embracing the neighbour. Lastly, the paper brings out theoretical underpinnings which can help societies interacting with migrants to find better ways of finding long term solutions. For this we cite Farrall (2015) and Rambo (1993) whose approach to the Conversion theory helps the discussion look for the transformational processes from

the linear and non linear perspectives. Fathali Moghaddam (2005) had researched on what came to be titled the *Staircase to Terrorism: a Psychological Exploration*. From the discussion on the staircase model, Moghaddam introduced six stages one can ascent to becoming a terrorist. Alienation and perceived injustices seem to drive the other four. These and other models are discussed to give a comprehensive overview on the process of deradicalisation. The youth not engaged in an enabling activity could easily be pulled into radicalization agenda.

While it is true that society can easily be radicalised by the new situation of migrants and refugees, there is emerging data shows that believers and practitioners of certain religion can help bring about an enabling environment for the much desired coexistence and social transformation. Gerard Clarke (2009), Denuelin and Bano (2009) from their empirical data concluded that religion has values that help its members to help the neighbour. Doing good is an intrinsic good of what faith practices are all about. Be it Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh and Confucianism. When members of a certain faith see hungry, sick and suffering people they do not turn away and leave them to suffer. Families become the vanguard of such values in earnest.

The problem area

To fight radicalization in society the process should not just target those youth over thirteen years include even children below ten years old. According to a research conducted by the Nordiska African Institute (2016)¹, radicalization of youths and their recruitment to commit violent and illegal activities is not unique to one group or faith. Every society has experienced recruitment of the youth by criminal gangs, ethnic sects, business gurus and local militias. At times child soldiers are as a result of radicalization. As long as Kenya's domestic politics remain divisive, corruption prevails, inequality and lack of political voice continue, the youth of all ethnic groups will be vulnerable and susceptible to believing the promises made by recruiting leaders to slow staircase into radicalization. In another study, factors contributing factors to radicalization and terrorism could be from families or society they come from not faith. Wright & Piper (1986), Wuthnow & Mellinger (1978), see the role of families and cults as an influencing factor to the youth joining deviant religious groups and also helping in de-camping from those groups. There is

evidence that even civilized societies tend to radicalize people when they feel marginalized by intruders or see their space occupied by foreigners. They develop a nationalistic agenda to build walls and segregation. Psychologists will argue that fear of unknown people can rattle society to resist interaction, if the intruder is favoured or practices a different faith. Laffer (2011) presents the case of the Jews in late 1930s who were resisted in Europe to make a strong case of economic privilege radicalization.

Ideal situation is that no society wishes to see its youth radicalized. The youth have been given many titles that reflect the future of society, families and the future of the country is in their hands. It is also a Universal claim that a society that upholds good moral values tends to be very successful. But a society where there is conflict, war and terrorist activities the drop will take a whole generation to catch up with development. Religion cannot be wholly taken as the main trigger of radicalization. It could be a rallying tool for those economically, politically and marginalized in their own communities to fight back. In this case it cannot be a muslim only problem. If children have been brought up well, appreciating the meaning of life, accepting others despite their social, economic, religious affiliation, then there would be no radicalization that could lead to terrorist activities.

The institute for war and peace reporting (IWPR, 2017) has collected many interesting narratives on the route to radicalization. In the research conducted in 2017 by Wanja Gathu, an IWPR journalist, we reflect on this story of an eight year old boy who found himself confronted with a situation of radicalization.

It reads, the class of the eight year olds was introduced to how to dismantle a gun and re-assemble it by their class teacher. The boy went home later in the evening feeling very excited. His parents wondered why their son was full of energy that day. His mother learnt that his science teacher had taught the class how to dismantle and reassemble a gun. In the same lesson, he also learned how to shoot at targets and practiced firing at the blackboard with a toy pistol. According to Moses, the teacher told the class he was preparing them to defend themselves against terrorists. "I was shocked," the mother told IWPR. "I asked my son to tell me exactly when and by whom the lesson was given. He identified a teacher. I took a decision to go to school and talk to the administrators." The conclusion was that the boy did not see anything wrong from the explanation by their teacher because it was like revisiting the war games they watch on TV or Xbox. It became clear that educationalists were targeting and indoctrinating children to become potential members of extremist groups and a pose a huge threat to their families, the country and the region. The response from a clinical psychologist and educationist to IWPR was that, "If they are fed with

¹Hellsten, *Radicalisation and terrorist recruitment among Kenya's youth*. Policy Note No 1:2016. The Nordic Africa Institute, February 2016

extremist ideas and are de-sensitized to violence and murder, they become the worst kind of killers.” (IWPR,2017)²

From this excerpt we see that radicalization can start with children at that tender age and influence their character to grow into becoming walking weapons. This is a concern to the Kenya government and families. The IWPR input helped us to reflect further what is meant by radicalization and the role families can play in curbing its spread. Amy-Jane Gielen (2015) had observed why families and the broader professional network of the family, including school teachers, should enable practitioners and family members to act upon early warning signals and prevent influence from family members and peers to radicalizing the youth.

Methodology

The study was informed by the literature that discusses radicalization among the youth and how families can play a key role in educating their children on the family values to reduce their involvement in radicalization. The key theories reflect on social wellbeing of youth in a given society and the role of families. The internationalism or global theories cited give the understanding that radicalization is a global phenomena that requires concerted efforts by all to reach a better understanding of the causes and control. The Push pull factor theory has a great influence on the migration theory. From this theory we can trace reasons why people move to Europe and across continents and starting finding long term solutions.

There are theories cited which reflect on the psychological theories of radicalization. Studies in USA, Canada, UK, Germany and the Middle East have helped understand the psychological needs of the youth and what society can do to help them. These theories help to bring out clear suggestions on why families in Africa, Asia, Middle East, Europe, America and Canada can help change the desire of the youth to joining terror networks and extremist groups with the intention of causing harm to their own people. Faith based organisations have been picked out as key institutions which while seen as instigators of violence to being the answer to rehabilitating the radicalized youth. There are social teachings from these faiths which touch on the moral and ethical behavior of society towards those bent to causing harm.

Eastleigh is selected because it has a large population of Somali Community. They call it the Little Mogadishu. It is an entry and exit point for most Somali

Businessmen. The study targeted Youth from both Kenyan and Somali Somalis.

Hypotheses

1. That radicalization of the youth is caused by a myriad of factors from structural to across continents. And not just religion.
2. De-radicalisation incorporates a social transformation that brings about total wellbeing of the people.

Objectives

The following are the objectives of the study:

- i. To build an understanding that religion, especially Islam, is behind the radicalization of the youth, rather, any society can easily be radicalized if infiltrated by refugees, migrants and foreigners.
- ii. To examine whether push and pull factors contribute to the radicalization of youth, the case of Eastleigh Nairobi.
- iii. To critique the role families (households) play in inculcating moral and ethical values in their children as they grow and help contain any situations which could lead to intolerance of others.

The Background .

The UN 2016 declaration on migration and refugees reaffirmed the commitment of Member States to protect the human rights of all migrants, regardless of status. The affirmation here was to make it easy for people of all generations, race, colour and creed to migrate and live in peace devoid of conflict. In this category were the youth who are easily lured into terrorist activities when their grievances are not addressed. The UN being aware of this predicament it called for a special assembly to address youth and radicalization.

The UN General Assembly Plenary on September 21st 2017 unanimously agreed that youth radicalisation towards violent extremism has become a global phenomenon that threatens peace, security and stability (UN,2017). From 2014 there has been major international campaigns to wage war on radicalization and de-radicalization of the youth globally (Bizina, M., & Gray, D. H. (2014). This global concern has targeted the youth from Africa, Asia, Europe and America. The conclusion from the studies carried from 2014 indicate that the youth are gullible and susceptible to the lures of the recruitersto joining terrorist networks. Chin (2015) pointed out some of the causes of radicalisation by attributing them to a complex set of interconnected factors and not just religion. Some of the causes emerge from the consequences of social exclusion and marginalization of vulnerable groups. Research in Africa, Middle East other regions brings

² The institute for war and peace reporting (IWPR).2017.January 30.

out some of the factors contributing to the youth joining terror networks have very little to do with religion. Costanza (2015) identified some of these causes as the political, economic, cultural, technological, legal, social and individual concerns. However, the recent studies coming from Syria, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Somalia and Libya do not exclude religion. Religion is part of the diverse ideologies, identity and gender related factors which have emerged as helping in the drive for recruitment (Maskaliūnaitė, 2015). The question of identity has led McLeod, (2008) to promote the social identity theory as a major contributor to radicalization. Costanza (2015) raises new questions for further research indicating that the path to radicalisation is complex in nature, especially when the hidden triggers and causes are not addressed. Religion can easily be grafted into the structural causes as a rallying force for action and not that religion is under attack therefore believers of that faith should defend themselves. At the centre of the different theories, presentations, discussions from the data analyses, the youth discussed in the debate as the victim and as the main architect of radicalization. The aftermath of 9/11 created the impression that terrorists were lurking out there and must be stopped before they reach mainland USA and Europe. Little attention was paid to homegrown terrorists. It dawned on most researchers that the main culprits in this debate were the youth living among them. The youth were gullible and easy targets for the would be master minders of terrorism. The USA and European countries thought the youth should be intercepted out there before they caused any harm.

However, the quick diversion from the attention drawn to terrorists abroad to homegrown became a reality in the aftermath of the 2005 July London bombings³ Terrorism scholars and policy makers started focusing on "home-grown" terrorism rather than those beyond the European and USA borders (King and Donald, 2011). The danger posed by returning youth from the war in Syria, Yemen and Afghanistan was a major global concern. The situation was worsened when in 2017, the daily news started relaying updates on former radicalized fighters leaving different frontlines for their respective home countries. These individuals were known, they knew their

neighbourhood well and given a chance, they could pick out targets without being suspected. The recruitment of youth to join warring factions in Somalia, Libya, Tunisia, Egypt and Mali were a clear manifestation of what could happen if the situation of returning youths is not handled well. Neighboring countries to Somalia like Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Tanzania were already threatened by homegrown terrorists. The returnees were a threat to state security and the economic wellbeing of the people in these countries in general (Rozila Kana and Rupert Dore, 2015).

The recent threat posed by returning youth from the frontline has also affected refugees and genuine victims of violence caused by warring in their countries to migrate to safer countries. Whenever there had been war of any form, people have tended to move out to safer lands. However, this once human act of helping the neighbor is slowly waning due to the threat of migration, knowing well that radicalized youth could also hide among migrants and easily become a threat to state security. Studies show that migration across continents is driven by pull and push factors like searching for employment and giving their families a fulfilled wellbeing. There are cases emerging where once peaceful communities have been radicalized to resist migrants and refugees coming in across borders. In some countries there have been suggestions to build walls to stop arriving communities from mixing with their own. There have been even suggestions to build a wall in the Mediterranean Sea to keep away migrants from crossing over to Europe. Martin Plout, while reporting for the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, School of Advanced Study, May 3rd 2017, brought to light a deal negotiated and signed in secret by Italian leaders. The deal brought to Italy, leaders of the Toubou and Awlad Sulaiman ethnic groups in Libya and agreed to build walls to halt the arrival of more African migrants and refugees on mainland Europe. The EU politicians under pressure from their own electorate endorsed the deal. It is for this reason that the youth can play a big role in the war on radicalization. Briggs (2010) had argued that the efforts on deradicalisation should not be left to the state and government of the day but all citizens of any given country can assist in solving the triggers of extremism and terrorism caused by radicalization. We find that de-radicalising citizens when already grown ups is not easy. The solution should start with families in a given household. In our case, we chose the Somali Community in Eastleigh, Nairobi to show that despite the youth being Muslim, their families and the Somali Community at large, has helped the youth to avoid being radicalized through a programme of Islamic values fused with social entrepreneurship. The youth here have been brought up to understand their religion and culture, cultivate respect, believe in themselves and address most of the tension society goes through.

³On 7 July 2005, four suicide bombers attacked London, killing 52 people and injuring hundreds more. For more information see: Rodgers, Lucy, Salim Qurashi and Steven Connor: "7 July London bombings: What happened that day?", *BBC*, (3 July 2015), <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-33253598> Accessed 20th August 2018

The response from most governments has been a call to countering migration, violent extremism and terrorism. The call to action has become undeniably complex. It required frontline practitioners already interacting with the youth seen as vulnerable to radicalization, to come up with the right tools for social transformation. They need to recognise, respond to and challenge ideologies and narratives associated with any form of radicalization that leads to extremism (Rozila Kana & Rupert Dore, 2015).

The concern for finding longterm solutions to radicalization made it possible to find out the role of families in engaging with the youth at all stages of their growth and development. The global perspective based on literature review helps to address the influence of parents on their children and how radicalization can be overcome. It brings to the forefront the fact that religion does not have to be an excuse. It is an open secret that the recent migration of Africans and Middle easterns into Europe has radicalized once peaceful families in Europe.

Theories that explain radicalization

Current studies show that there is no agreed definition on radicalisation. Research shows that definitions on what radicalization is depends greatly on the experience of each country. To underscore this argument, the study cites examples from the United States of America, Canada, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany, Saudi Arabia and other countries.

The U.S. Congressional Research Service Report, 2013, approached radicalization from the standpoint of the Jihadist terrorism. For them radicalization is defined as "the process of acquiring and holding radical, extremist or jihadist beliefs. This activity is not necessarily illegal." It implies that anyone holding beliefs which are radical and extremist or harbouring jihadist beliefs whether in the USA or outside the US could be considered radicalized. This definition tends to direct USA policy on pursuing extremists and terror networks at home and abroad. Whitton (2015) while analysing this strategy by the USA asked the question to prevent or pursuit as the government's new deradicalization strategy, could it be the solution or could fuel the formation of more radicalized groups?

The emphasis of the definition by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police is on the process by which individuals, and in this case the young people, when introduced to an overtly ideological message and belief system that encourages movement from moderate, mainstream beliefs towards extreme views", can be radicalized. One can trace this definition to the recent terrorist attacks on the Canadian community by people presumed to be quite young to have been caught up with radicalized minds to exert terror on a once

peaceful society. Ahmad (2017), Calgary Police Department (2016b), Bell, S. (2014), joined other researchers to argue that Youth radicalization leading to violence has become a growing fear among Canadians, as terrorist attacks are carried out in Western states. Although Canada has suffered relatively fewer acts of violence, this fear has intensified and a de-radicalization strategy is needed in the Canadian context. The research by Ahmad (2017) found the big challenge in the Social identity theory which helped to explain that youth join radicalized groups to feel a sense of belonging and have to be provided an alternative and moderate group identity to de-radicalize. Tajfel (1979 and 1981) had given clear indicators as to why identity is a key factor in some countries. Tajfel based his study on his own experiences of living under Hitler's Nazi and found the question of identity can lead groups to xenophobia and extremist activities. The solution was to propose a youth de-radicalization process in Canada best served through a community collaboration approach (Angus Reid Institute, 2016). Wilton. (2016) agreed with Wade (2015) on why Canada needs a stronger deradicalization program. Wilton wrote that to show their serious commitment to de-radicalisation the Canadian government had pledged \$35 million to fight radicalization.

The British Government has tended to look at radicalization from within its own society in general. The Government defines radicalization as "the process by which people come to support terrorism and violent extremism and, in some cases, then to participate in terrorist groups."

This definition has been greatly influenced by the London Bombings of July 7th, 2005. The terrorist activities were carried out by some youth and adults who had been radicalized at mosques in London.

The Netherlands has experienced its own share of radicalization from its own dutch politicians. Jongman (2016) gave a captivating discussion on how the Netherlands has dealt with radicalization. Three events are key to this discussion. First, the aftermath of 9/11, when measures were put into place to address the rising challenge, that homegrown terrorists could pose a greater challenge to security of their once peaceful society. The government policy on this divided public opinion on how to go about fighting terrorism without creating radicalization. Second, targeting homegrown groups like the Hofstad-group. This group comprised mostly youth coming from the Moroccan community in the Netherlands was accused of engaging in terrorist activities. Members of this organization were arrested and convicted to long prison sentences. Now the threat has diminished but the alarm has been sounded on the danger posed by those returning from Syria, Afghanistan. Third, the rise of a dutch Member of Parliament, Geert Wilders. Wilders used a Salafist jihadi groups provocative video

Titled "Fitna" to justify attacks directed against Dutch interests.

Therefore, the Dutch Government, through the General Intelligence and Security Service or AIVD, defines radicalization as "the (active) pursuit of and/or support to far-reaching changes in society which may constitute a danger to (the continued existence of) the democratic legal order (aim), which may involve the use of undemocratic methods (means) that may harm the functioning of the democratic legal order (effect)." The Ofstad Group and Salafists fell under this category of terror groupings. The Dutch definition agrees with the Danish Intelligence Service (PET), which defines radicalization as "a process by which a person, to an increasing extent, accepts the use of undemocratic or violent means, including terrorism, in an attempt to reach a specific political/ ideological objective." In general the definitions differ in context and execution depending on the experience of the individual country. The differentiation arises from the fact that some of the definitions connect radicalization with extreme beliefs, while others connect it with both beliefs and actions (Schmid, 2013). On the one hand, the Canadian and American definitions reflect radicalization as a cognitive phenomenon. The British, Danish and Dutch definitions connect it not only with ideas, but also with means used and actions applied to create social disorder. This is part of the controversy around radicalization, given that a person with 'extreme' beliefs but without putting them in practice could be considered as radicalized. It is also interesting that the US definition says that "this activity is not necessarily illegal". This viewpoint could justify why for instance in America, the Trump administration sees migration as a negative thing when most countries see organized migration as positive for work and revenue generation to fill gaps left by the aging society.

Another area of concern emerging from the debate stems from the word 'radicalization' itself. How do you come to agree on what is considered as radical and to what would one compare it to? Scholars are pondering on the meaning of the word 'radical' by suggesting that it depends on what is considered as 'mainstream' in a particular society for a given period of time. They agree that radicalization should be a context-dependent term. Political, religious, historical and cultural factors may influence the characterization of an idea as radical or mainstream. For example, the principle of free speech is still considered as radical in Uganda and other countries under strong rulers.

As we end this section on the definition of radicalization, we are left with a clear conclusion that as the definitions differ and not having a clear viewpoint on what can be considered radical, we ask the question: Who is considered radicalized? The answer is uncertain.

A qualitative research conducted by the Research, Information and Counter-Terrorism Unit

(RICU) found that there are many British Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Somali who reject the terrorists' means, but sympathize their causes

Can we consider those people as radicalized? The definitions may agree that not all radicals are terrorists, but they definitely disagree on the relationship between radicalization and violence. It is not clear if a person has to adopt a violent behavior, apart from radical ideas, in order to be 'labeled' as radicalized.

As we have already mentioned, the main criticism of radicalization is that it is a political term and therefore it is used for political purposes. In its infancy "the radicalization discourse was circumscribed by the demands of counter-terrorist policy-makers rather than an attempt to objectively study how terrorism comes into being."

Using political definition of radicalization, diverted the focus mainly on Muslims. The aim was to articulate how Muslims tend to support extremist ideologies and/or become terrorists. It brings in the debate the psychological and theological factors to offer a more comfortable ground for social analysis. From the politicized definition, radicalization becomes generally depoliticized and more associated with religious factors. Even if in some cases politics are acknowledged to be associated with radicalization, using phrases like 'grievances against real or perceived injustices', this is only due to the vast empirical evidence.

The media has played a significant role in carrying forward and articulating debate on radicalization. Western media has worked alongside the policy-makers, in attempting to identify the factors leading to terrorism. Media seem to "rely increasingly on a conventional wisdom of radicalization" which offers an easy way to deliver simple answers that all audiences can understand and hence, facilitate several policy responses. For instance, using the orientalist school, the emphasis will be about western values versus other values. The orientalist school associated with arguments of Said (1979) tend to show that societies prone to radicalization and terrorism tend to live in a world of self denial. They deny the presence of terrorist activities within their borders. The terrorists are out there and religion must be the cause.

The question gets weakened when you ask whose values are bringing out values better. Therefore, the Media seems to give great emphasis on the different values and cultural properties of the western states and the Muslim societies. They have frequently described Muslims as people who cannot understand the liberal lifestyle of countries like the United Kingdom and its allies in the West. This raises concern over 'community cohesion' and promotion of the right values. The media will pick out the 'Muslim culture' (of wearing the hijab, arranged marriages, reciting holy

book and others as a threat to traditional western society and values of the west.

The outcome of such an approach to understanding radicalization is polarization of the community. According to the American definition of radicalization, then both the Muslims and the accusing media generate radicalization. The solution has been always assimilation in these societies. It brings out a debate on how to bring out the emphasis on the different values and cultural properties between the western countries and the Muslim societies. The focus group becomes those Muslims who have been born and raised in western countries, like the United Kingdom, but refuse assimilation into society and share the same values with the other members. This is why one of the measures that governments take is the assimilation of Muslims.

To sum up, radicalization is a controversial term, which tries to explain a complex problem, terrorism, in a very simplistic way, lacking clarity. There is no doubt that it tends to serve political purposes, without really filling a gap in terrorism studies. For all these reasons, the use of this term does not really help "to establish why people become terrorists or what the trajectory into terrorism might be." Nevertheless, we cannot deny that the rationale behind radicalization is not wrong, ie the need to explain terrorism and try to prevent it. Nobody can deny that a person does not become terrorist overnight; the idea that there is a process behind this is right, but if we want to establish an effective counter- terrorism policy, we need a strong and clear explanation of the phenomenon. This is why it is necessary to distinguish between causes of terrorism and 'background contributing factors'; the contributing factors that lead to radicalization are not causes for terrorism. [4400 words]

radicalization and migration

There is a strong relationship between radicalization and migration. The context of this study was strengthened by returning youth from terror activities abroad. It raised the perspective that defining radicalization from the view of the individual and their motivation, rather than the overused narrative of the external factors attributed to radicalization by religious leaders would be best approach(Kundnani,2014). The psychologists have also tried to digest the motivation factors and divided them into internal and external causes. If the cause of radicalization was external, then it was linked to some fundamentalists and terror networks. If internal then it implied some psychological traits that require careful examination before one can blame religion as the trigger of radicalization which leads to terrorism. The internal factors have driven attention to the role families play in raising their children to become responsible citizens or terrorists.

Families can be catalysts for controlling radicalization by creating the best programmes for de-radicalization when the youth return from the frontline. The literature on radicalization is diverse and without a clear consensus in definition. There is no comprehensive understanding of radicalization, its drivers and pathways. Crossett and Spitaletta (...) have critiqued the definition of radicalization where it is used as an umbrella term, under which notions such as extremism, radicalism, and terrorism are, at best, not distinguished and, at worst, conflated. The European Union, for example, defines violent radicalism as, "the phenomenon of people embracing opinions, views and ideas which could lead to acts of terrorism." This kind of definition can easily drift into accusing a particular religion as the one responsible for radicalizing its people. That is why it is important to diffuse and dispel the popular notion that a particular religion is responsible for radicalization and global terrorism. There is enough empirical data to show that the causes of radicalization have very little to do with a particular faith, in this case Islam. The territorial mobility of migrants is a major source of conflict and radicalization. Any community can be radicalized if certain people termed unwanted come into the neighbourhood and disrupt the normal flow of things. In this case, migrants tend to find themselves at odds with communities they encounter. These migrants are accused of occupying space, seeking residence, introducing change in form of a culture unknown to locals. At times the migrants will often be accused of taking over jobs meant for local citizens. Governments can be put under immense pressure to send migrants away. Should the government resist the anti-migrant slogans will emerge, families will incite and radicalize their own people to resist any interaction with migrants. It is even worse if there is fatality caused by a migrant. Crossett and Spitaletta offer a broader definition of radicalisation as, "the process by which an individual, group, or mass of people undergo a transformation from participating in the political process via legal means to the use or support of violence for political purposes." This definition would suit political groups that seek power through the ballot as the best way to bring about a just society. At times, if extreme violence is used, it could flare into national crisis and trigger unrest in big cities.

The current situation in Germany is a case in Mind. The City of Chemnitz, in the eastern side of Germany has experienced riots recently. It is claimed in the local dailies that the murder of a thirty five year old German was committed by people purportedly to be of Iraqi and Syrian origin. What surprised most people across Europe is the way the a certain group of people of Chamnitz reacted by fuelling the ambers of radicalization and arm twisting the German government to chase away migrants from their society completely. The BBC captured the episode on 27th

August 2018 by reporting that a far right street movement called Pegida, the far-right street movement had been leading in demonstrations. By doing this, those who do not like migrants were being radicalized. Even Markus Frohnmaier, the local MP from the AfD, a far-right political party, tweeted that "If the state is no longer able to protect citizens then people should take to the streets and protect themselves. He urged the citizen to stop the lethal 'knife migration!'", by alluding to the influx of migrants in recent years. "It could have targeted your father, son or brother!". This kind of statement can radicalize people and bring about hate among peace loving citizens. This is a clear indication that radicalization can be by any group and not necessarily due to religion.

Therefore, if one was to take the EU definition and define radicalization through the equally contested lens of terrorism then it will dilute the causes. This is because Western scholars and agencies have tended to define radicalisation from political science, social psychology, or terrorism perspectives. The definitions coming from territorial mobility are still being developed. The arrival of migrants in certain societies can easily build tension among locals and cause radicalization as the case in Germany and other EU Countries. If we take the example by Borum, who simply defines radicalization as the "process of developing extremist ideologies and beliefs", then we could easily argue that AfD in Chamnitz is slowly developing extremist ideologies and beliefs among its own citizens. Borum's and the EU definitions fail to acknowledge the process of transformation usually at work before a person becomes radicalised. The case of Chamnitz brings out the concept of intolerance that seems to take upper stage whenever the issue of migration comes about. This is where we look at how families play a role in planting the right values to youth comes into play. Families can help remove any forms of radicalization as they grow, with the aim of making them better citizens, tolerant to foreigners, race and people of other faiths. It also The term "radicalization" is defined as a process by which a person adopts belief systems to justify the use of violence to effect social change. This social change can be achieved by employing violent means for political purposes. From this definition we can trace radicalization to countries in Europe that resist entry of migrants in their states, as a good example. The Dutch Intelligence and Security Service defines it as, "the (active) pursuit of and/or support to far-reaching changes in society which may constitute a danger to (the continued existence of) the democratic legal order (aim), which may involve the use of undemocratic methods (means) that may harm the functioning of the democratic legal order (effect)." (Wittenveen, 2016). Arab scholars, however, generally define radicalisation as a group process. For Ba'albaki, radicalisation is the use of violence to impose social and political change by advocating

selfproclaimed in-group supremacy and a desire to 'purify' society. Arab scholarship also emphasises the armed radical groups currently impacting the region. They isolate Salafi Jihadism as a motivating violent radical ideology, rather than examining radicalism per se. ideology that combines calls for Islamic monotheism and violence to achieve unity and fight 'tyrannical' leaders).¹⁰ A further challenge of definitions relates to the distinction between radical ideology and violent radical behaviour. As Neumann notes, the "principal conceptual fault-line is between notions of radicalisation that emphasise extremist beliefs ('cognitive radicalisation') and those that focus on extremist behaviour ('behaviouralradicalisation')." The psychological dimensions of radicalization are very important too. Silke (2014) argued that causes of terrorism and extremism are found in undersanding critical issues in management, radicalisation and reform. This is a view that Lynch, Michalowski and Groves (2000) had raised when they observed that radicalization breeds criminals and as such theyouth in society can easily be radicalized into crime as a source of power and self identity. The psychology of radicalization has been clarified better by Mary Beth Altier et al. (2014, 647-661) in their journal of peace research 51 contribution titled, "Turning Away from Terrorism: Lessons from Psychology, Sociology, and Criminology,". Their point is that there is a lot more about radicalization that society should not dwell on religion as a precursor when the psychological dimensions are perhaps the main push and pull factors to youth being radicalized. Therefore, Borum (2017) advises that schools of radicalization and terrorism should embrace social psychology, supported by social movement theory and the less known conversion theories as part of the wider theoretical frameworks that can significantly improve radicalisation research.⁴

In trying to help the reader understand better the terminologies used in literature, Sha'ban has tried to distinguish between extremism and terrorism. Extremism relates to the realm of thought, while the latter concerning the realm of action. This distinction between radical ideology and the violent behaviour has influenced the divergent perspectives evident in the Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) literature. While some studies limit their discussion of radicalisation to individuals who were directly involved in violence, others confuse the dividing line between cognitive or psychic and behavioural radicalisation. The literature is also unclear on whether cognitive radicalisation is a pre-requisite to behavioural radicalisation; and if not, whether CVE efforts should focus solely on countering

⁴Borum (2017, 16-25), "Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories," in UNDERSTANDING RADICALISATION: A Literature Review of Models and Drivers. Published by the WANAI Institute, Royal Scientific Society in Amman, Jordan.

behavioural radicalisation. However, in addressing how society gets radicalised like the case in Europe due to migration, this conceptual confusion complicates the task of defining radicalisation. Allen defines it as, the "process of adopting an extremist belief system, including the willingness to use, support, or facilitate violence, as a method to effect social change." This view would suit the events taking place in Germany and other EU countries where the public is generally feeling that migration is causing them psychological pain. In some cases they are helpless on how they should go about it.Concludes more specifically that radicalisation refers to: "a personal process in which individuals adopt extreme political, social, and/or religious ideals and aspirations, and where the attainment of particular goals justifies the use of indiscriminate violence. It is both a mental and emotional process that prepares and motivates an individual to pursue violent behaviour."

Taking these definitional positions into account, this paper understands radicalisation as the process of personal transformation that an individual goes through in response to contextual grievances. This transformation is marked by a personal crisis in search for role and meaning that eventually leads an individual to support the use of violence against state actors and civilians to bring about an ideologically-defined social and political order. A radicalised individual may have not directly engaged in violence, but supports its use for this purpose. Therefore, this paper embraces the important distinction between ideology and behaviour by focusing on the transition from radical ideology to violent behaviour. It examines the contextual circumstances and push and pull factors that influence individuals to embrace radical ideology, and why they later make the decision to join armed radical groups.

The conclusion is that migration has come out as one of the major causes of radicalization. From the definitions above we can aver that any society can be radicalised without necessarily citing religion as the main excuse. Migration has been discussed in forms and types. The various kinds depend on the flow and number of people involved, the reasons for their movement, the time spent in migration and the nature of migration. These are some forms of migration. Intercontinental migration is where people move across continents. The best examples have been African people crossing over to Europe, many Koreans moving from Asia to Brazil, in South America, Syrians crossing over to Europe. There is also intracontinental, where people have moved within the same continent. Rural urban migration, forced migration due to politics of the time or civil war. There are situations where people have moved to a new continent and impelled to migrate. This is also known as reluctant or imposed migration. This form of migration normally targets foreigners presumed not to have proper papers for

staying in that particular country. However there are also occupational migration where male or female migrants to urban centres looking for work. Territorial mobility based on space, residence, time, activity changes, and individual and family criteria. Irregular migration, internal migration, international migration. In this study we are concerned about these forms of migration and the influence they have on the communities they encounter.

The role of a household in the African context

Radicalization can be traced back to the household and the nature of the household. The normal appreciation of a household was radically different from the findings. The family and household as presented in this context was also complex. It meant a social structure that determines values of an individual, group or community. In the broader sense, the term family and household, in the African context, were not synonyms. The family was seen as a sub-clan or clan. Some pastoralist communities valued the family more, where everyone is referred to as brother or sister. The household can even be more challenging to define. The household is the basic unit of analysis in most social, microeconomic and national government models. It is a key factor in economics and when evaluating inheritance. Devereux & Haddinot (2005)⁵ give a metonymy that could mean the inmates of a house, all the persons forming one family, a household or descendants of a particular family leader and those who share the same family name and authority (GSSL2008)⁶. The Kenya integrated household budget survey (KIHBS2015) defines the household as the basic unit of analysis in many social, microeconomic and government models and fields of economics. In this case the household is defined as a family unit with an average demographic figure of five members. It differs from community to community some parts. It implies all the persons who occupy a housing unit. Sociologists would look at a household as the occupants who may be a single family, one person living alone, two or more families living together, or any other group of related or unrelated persons who share living arrangements (Encyclopaedia of sociology2018).⁷. The online business dictionary

⁵Devereux & Haddinot (1993) discussed in the report by Grace Bediako on the Ghana living standards survey report of the fifth round (GLSS 5)2008, p.4.

⁶ Grace Bediako reporting on the Ghana living standards survey report of the fifth round (GLSS 5)2008. Since then a new team has produced a sixth round report and now the seventh is coming out.

⁷"Family and Household Structure." [Encyclopedia of Sociology](#). Retrieved November 13, 2018 from

(2018) even qualifies the household from blood relations living under one roof or separate dwellings. In the pastoralist communities the understanding of a household is very diverse. The Somali households could have one name with many families living together in a clandom system. These clans like the Marehan, Degodia, Munde could pass for households (Orville 2014, Ahmed 1995).

The place of families in radicalization and de-radicalisation

The discussion on the household and the role of the family helps this study paint a picture deepening the understanding of youth radicalization process in society. The following discussion is about de-radicalisation and how the family can play both roles of radicalization and in de-radicalization process. McCauley and Moskaleiko (2010) had distinguished the difference between individual radicalization mechanisms, group mechanisms and mass mechanisms. The drivers of these radicalizations are the direct individual grievances and indirect political frustration. Some of the drivers already discussed earlier are the desire for improved status, thrill and 'unfreezing' a quest for belonging and integration after a loss of family or career could contribute to radicalization. They particularly pick out a situation where an individual identifies with a persecuted in-group. McCauley and Moskaleiko introduced the model they call the 'slippery slope' factor, which means the process of an increase in radical intensity after one joins a radical group. For McCauley and Moskaleiko the influence of family and friends in radicalization is a cause to worry about. However, if the society understands the importance of the family and friends then principally they can be used to reduce the risk of an individual becoming a radical and help in de-radicalization.

For McCauley and Moskaleiko (2010) do not propose a linear model, definitive process of mitigation, nor do they distinguish between radicalism and terrorism. Instead, their findings helped appreciate the diverse forms of political radicalism and terrorism from which one could find the process of de-radicalization.

From another earlier perspective held by Taylor and Horgan and Moghaddam, who have developed terrorism specific models. We shall discuss the 'Staircase to Terrorism' model by Moghaddam (2005). This model can be used to understand the individuals proceeding through six

stages in their ascent through radicalisation to the category of terrorist. These are feelings of alienation and perceived injustice are preceding factors. Some alienated individuals will search for the means to improve their condition. When they do not succeed in finding an alternative, feelings of anger and frustration accumulate. These feelings are manipulated by radical/terrorist figures who convince an individual to attribute her/his frustration to a specific enemy. Once convinced, these individuals have the potential to engage in physical violence against the enemy, and gradually adopt the terrorist mind-set. Once they regard the terrorist radicalization as completely legitimate, individuals are officially recruited. Finally, designated individuals are trained and their capacity is built in order to perform terrorist acts.

The most recent model which could aid de-radicalisation is the Conversion Theory by Farrall (2015) and Rambo (1993). These conversion theorists see radicalism as an ideology that individuals convert to either from other religious or secular ideologies, or even from other branches of radicalism. Farrall argues that the conversion theory offers valuable insight into radicalization research, because conversion is a transformational process that builds on the perception of the self and the group. This emphasis on radicalization as a process, which myriad factors contribute to, resonates with the general understanding of the radicalization process in the literature. Rambo adds to this discussion by providing a conversion model with seven non-linear components that influence an individual's conversion. One needs to look at the context, crisis, quest, encounter, interaction, commitment, and consequences. Context refers to larger surrounding factors that can prevent or facilitate conversion. Crisis is understood as the state of dissatisfaction produced by cognitive awareness of personal limitations within a given context. The quest refers to the active search for ideological alternatives. Encounter signals the first contact between an individual in quest and an ideology. The interaction component refers to wider involvement in seeking knowledge about the newly encountered ideology. Commitment depends on trust invested in the new ideology and belonging to the new in-group. Consequences refer to actions and decisions made to advance the new ideology.

It is important to underscore that Rambo (1993) and Farrall (2015) models analyse conversion to a new faith rather than to a religious-political ideology. The models explain the interactive elements that influence a change in convictions, the shift from an undesirable context to new convictions, and then to new radicalism inspired by such convictions. In this way, the model can explain the shift from contextual grievances to radical ideology and then to violent behavior.

The last in this category are the political, socio-economic, social, and cultural push and pull factors. The available literature is not conclusive on models to have in place to address deradicalization from these 12adical. For instance there are scholars from different regions who examine 12adicalization drivers from varying perspectives influenced by their own home situation. Specifically, Western scholars stress the psycho-social factors motivating European Jihadis whereas Middle Eastern scholars focus on political context while ignoring other factors. Such narrowness has resulted in a dearth of empirical evidence that might isolate lead drivers or explain driver interaction and confluence. Al-Harby (2011) conducted an insightful study on the , "Perceptions of Saudi Youth Towards Ideological Extremism." From this study we ome to know more about the Pull factors. Pull factors here are defined as "the positive characteristics and benefits of an extremist 12adicalizati that 'pull' vulnerable individuals to join. These include the group's ideology (e.g. emphasis on changing one's condition through violence rather than 'apathetic' and 'passive' democratic means), strong bonds of brotherhood and sense of belonging, reputation building, prospect of fame or glory, and other socialization benefits."They are different from the pull factors moving migrants from Africa to Europe.

The literature on Radicalisation Drivers often refers to 'push' and 'pull' factors. Push factors are seen as negative social, political, economic, and cultural root causes that influence individuals to join armed radical groups. Political Drivers refer to the causal relation between individual political factors and radicalisationis rarely discussed in the literature from the region (Hegghammer2006). One exception is a perception study of Jordanian students conducted in 2011 and 2015 which positively linked 12adicalization to political factors such as lack of freedom of expression and repression (although these factors were deemed less significant than social and religious factors). Daesh exploited the isolation and distance of Sunni tribes from central governments in both Iraq and Syria to form alliances. (al-DeenHaseeb 2016),Schmid2015, al-Harby2011).

Understanding the context of Eastleigh Nairobi

Bashir (2016) and Mulata (2015) conducted a conclusive research to give evidence that various factors contribute to youth radicalization in Kenya. The main ones include very high unemployment, marginalization of certain regions, idleness, false interpretation of religious teaching, and poverty. They also blame poor governance and government repression in the form of counter terrorism measures and lastly radicalized religious environments. The media has been blamed for irresponsible reporting,

fueling discrimination and lighting embers of radicalization. Globalization issues have come into play too the youth see their fellow youth being brutalized or praised for atrocities committed. Poor integration pattern in Kenya since independence has given ammunition to radicalization. The people in counties of Mandera, Wajir, Garissa, Marsabit, Turkana and the coastal counties always felt marginalised. It is not a wonder that radicalization is strong here.

1. Push and pull factors revisited

Most studies show the push and pull factors drive radicalization most. Push factors are the negative social, cultural, and political features of one's societal environment that are "pushing" vulnerable individuals towards violent extremism. Push factors are what are commonly known as the underlying root causes such as poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, discrimination, political and economic marginalization(Hassan,2012)⁸. Pull factors, on the other hand, are the positive characteristics and benefits of an extremist organization that "pull" vulnerable individuals to join. These include the ideology of a group, which could emphasis on changing one's condition through violence rather than *apathetic* and *passive* democratic means. They are strong bonds of brotherhood which bring about sense of belonging, reputation building, prospect of fame glory, and other socialization benefits(Hellsten,2016).

However, a recent critique of the push and pull factors gave three important arguments. Malik (2010) argued that radicalisationhas not been well understood by most politicians. The misconception has driven and shaped much the domestic counterterror policy around the world, especially Europe and USA⁹.He cites the 2008 British MI5 study on extremism in the UK, which observed that "far from being religious zealots, a large number of those involved in terrorism do not practise their faith regularly". The report also falsely raised the social justice flag as the main contributor to radicalization that breeds extremism. The report

⁸MuhsinHassan.Understanding Drivers of Violent Extremism: The Case of al-Shabab and Somali Youth. Combating terrorism centre.<https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/understanding-drivers-of-violent-extremism-the-case-of-al-shabab-and-somali-youth>.VoL 5, ISSUE 8, August 23, 2012.report no. 18/cited 30/1/2017.

⁹Malik,Kenan,*The Quest for a Moral Compass: A Global History of Ethics*. London, 2015. He is also a broadcaster with Al Jazeera. His previous publication is *From Fatwa to Jihad*, shortlisted for the 2010 George Orwell Prize. He writes at Pandaemonium: www.kenanmalik.wordpress.com

concluded that the would-be jihadis are particularly poor, uneducated and poorly integrated. What was more astonishing, according to Malik, was the verdict from the researchers from London's Queen Mary College. Their findings were that there was a clear strong link between "social inequalities or poor education", to being radicalized and becoming extremist. Malik(2017) cites Marc Sageman who crashed the argument by the Queen Mary College. Sageman, a former CIA operative, currently a counterterrorism consultant to the US government and conducting research on causes of radicalization and extremism found that terrorists are often among the best and brightest" from "caring, middle-class families". When this question was put to the twenty five respondents they could not see social inequalities as a factor but not education. They saw a confluence of factors that led the youth to join al-Shabab.

2. The religion and poverty argument

Religion as a factor argument was flawed and did not convince the youth as the main conventional radicalisation thesis. Kenan Malik (2015) argued that it is not religion that drives aspiring jihadis to terror but the politics¹⁰. There is evidence that Western intervention in Muslim-majority countries, had pushed many young Muslims into the hands of the jihadists. The convergence is where the conventional thesis focuses on the "pull" factor of fundamentalist Islam and the "push" factor led by the Western foreign policy. Taspınar (2016) calls it 'relative deprivation' and refers to 'frustrated achievers', those youth who are educated and ambitious but lack real opportunities to go forward¹¹. Youth frustration increases when they begin to compare their circumstances with those of the wealthy elites around them. Also when they compare their own reduced prospects for progress with better opportunities in the developed world. The inability to perceive progress over prolonged periods of time back home could also result in disillusionment that breeds radicalization. The psychological and social strain of these circumstances on young individuals could lead them to seek a sense of purpose through other avenues that change course and challenge the status quo.

3. Migration Pattern

¹⁰ Malik, Kenan, *The push and pull of extremism* Radicalisation is a process born out of alienation and our atomised world. Al Jazeera 2015, October 7th.

¹¹ Ömer Taşpınar is a Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution; Professor of National Security Strategy, U.S. National War College. See his article: *ISIS Recruitment and the Frustrated Achiever*, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/amer-tapaenar-/isis-relative-deprivation_b_6912460.html. updated November 8, 2016. Cited 31/1/2017.

Global Push factors related to migration and resistance from recipient countries has driven the radicalization agenda. The youth from Eastleigh are lucky they can run their own enterprises and keep the laws of the land even if they came from Somalia. The global phenomenon of migration today keeps altering patterns of living (Espisova, 2009). Tension created breeds radicalization. According to the International Organization for Migration (2015)¹² the total number of migrants across the world had increased from 150 million in 2000 to 214 million in 2010. It meant that over 3.1 percent of the world's population was composed of migrants. In a study conducted by SUNY Levin Institute¹³ shows that by 2012 worldwide migration had grown to 230 million people (The Economist 2012). These migratory trends have arisen largely in response to the surge of international capital investment and manufacturing business in search of cheap land and labor. For example, Chinese emigration also includes lower skill labor groups, who may utilize unauthorized means of migration (Song, 2013). Europe has experienced a big rise immigration. Some countries have taken it well (Arango, 2013). Willsher, K. (2012), in the Guardian UK wrote that immigration has been at the forefront of French election campaigns. This led to widespread resistance to immigration by the French citizens. President Nicolas Sarkozy pursued highly restrictive immigration policy during his term until 2012. In 2011 alone, over 33,000 immigrants were deported from France. According to the Guardian (2012) the new right-wing government members pushed for additional limits on legal migration as well. These are some of the push and pull factors that can fuel radicalization if not well managed.

This argument shows that resistance to foreigners could fuel radicalization. It also generates what Seth J. Schwartz et al (2009) presented as identity crisis within their own countries and where one has migrated to, could be a factor that drives radicalization. Seth Schwartz argued that terrorism represents a confluence of cultural, social, and personal identity to underscore the intertwined nature of religion and nationality in their sense of identity. However, it does not necessarily indicate religious zealotry, of the youth. It particularly underlines the role of a cultural identity strongly rooted in collectivism where prioritizing the group over oneself could lead to accepting terrorism. The Eastleigh youth did not see this as a problem where they live despite the global trend in chasing away migrants. The local community of Eastleigh has been very accommodating and

¹² United Nations. (2016). *International migration report 2015. Population Division*. <https://doi.org/ST/ESA/SER.A/384>

¹³ SUNY (State University of New York) <http://www.globalization101.org>

supportive. One of the interviewee summed up the discussion as follows,

“People who encourage young people to form these views are not true believers and cannot call themselves Muslims. Young people believe these views as they are impressionable and want to fit into some sort of group so will do accept misguided views in order to fit in a group.”2017,January 14.

Families do not like to see their children enter crime or take part in activities that break the law. For Islam breaking the law is punishable harshly.

Research question

The key question of the study

- i. Ask whether Muslims are to blame for the ever pressing global reaction to radicalization and terrorist activities.
- ii. The role of families in radicalization is questioned to de-mystify the fact that radicalization cannot be labelled as a Muslim problem bssed on activities committed by the youth.

Justificcation of the study in Eastleigh

We selected an area of Nairobi called Easteleigh with a sizeable population of Muslims or Somali origin.

The Muslim migrants here from Somalia have integrated well because they do not interfere with local economic wellbeing. The migrants from Somalia are very entrepreneurial in nature. The findings in Eastleigh, Nairobi helped add value to the conclusion that the radicalization process is not a Islam issue but all people of all faiths, creed, races, groups, can be radicalized depending on their situation. The

discrimination used by leaders as a rallying call for resistance can be trigger radicalisation. Those in other parts of the world, sympathetic to suffering brethren can rush in to help, at times not knowing the details of the problem at hand.

Data findings from Eastleigh Area of Nairobi

This paper is informed by an ongoing survey on a group of Muslim youth of Somali community living in Eastleigh, Nairobi. This is a populous region of Nairobi where most peaceful and hardworking Muslim families live. Kenya is home to approximately 4.3 million Muslims (10% of the population). The discussion centred on the causes of radicalization and how families can help reduce the spread. A total of twenty five (25) youth and fifteen elders(15) took part in the survey by filling out a questionnaire and through focus group discussions. Ten (10) families that included father and mother were interviewed together. The rest were seven (7) youth who were self-employed by selling all manner of electronics. Eight (8) were running retail shops. In this category were five(5) young women from the Somali community who doubled up as entrepreneurs and students in local colleges and Universities.

Table below summaries the findings as follows: 25 youth intervied through a questionnaire

And 15 elders in different households of Eastleigh.

Youth (M) self employed (7); running retail shops (8); Female youth(F): entrepreneurs and students (5)

Elders (15): Imams (2), Youth Leaders(5), Businessmen (3) and Clan leaders (3) working in Somalia and Eastleigh for youth subsistence (2).The

focus group discussions covered 10 families in Eastleighar a place they call Garissa Wholesaler located in Section 9 area of Eastleigh (Also see Figure 1).




Figure 1: Summary of Data findings from Eastleigh Area of Nairobi

The **objectives** of the study were:

- i. To dispel the notion that it is not the case that only Muslim youths can be radicalised, rather youth from all faiths can be radicalized.
- ii. To examine the impact of push and pull factors on radicalization and terrorism.
- iii. To discuss the role of families (households) in developing the moral and ethical values among their children as they grow, with the intention of avoiding being radicalized and pushed into terrorist activities.

4. Countering radicalization from weekly social Gatherings

The focus group discussion with five youths brought out the argument that where the youth have had created space for coming together to share daily challenges helped to reduce radicalization. The Muslim youth who meet weekly for prayers and also work have not time for extremism related activities. Amy-Jane Gielen (2015) has presented interesting models used in some European countries like Denmark, Belgium and Germany to allow families to connect with their youth in extremist groups and convince them to come back home. Denmark has (Aarhus) family talk groups were set up by the municipality or by affected parents, 'Les parents concernés' in Belgium. The weekly forums can be used to educate the youth on positive values of life. For instance, why killing is wrong and joining gangs is not accepted in any society. The youth also concurred that in order to curb radicalization there is a need for the government to stop the marginalization especially in the North Eastern counties of Kenya.

The government through county authorities should channel more funds to creation of employment programs that will keep the youth occupied. More educated youth and support for families in poverty can help change ideologies of radicalization. This can be done through proper schools, faith based centres of worship like churches, temples and Mosques. Anna Mühlhausen (2017) has observed that conflict management, transitional Justice and de-radicalization can occur through process of reconciliation in post-conflict societies, negotiations and the renouncement of violent means.

This approach could help African governments to disengage from past strategies adopted like hard-power responses, disproportionate and arbitrary response from law enforcement, relentless operations which have intensified hatred among marginalized communities and reason for extremism. Anna Mühlhausen (2017) sees re-integration can be achieved by re-opening communication with the radicalized youth.

The Kenya Government needs to adopt a more robust, comprehensive, multifaceted and inclusive terrorism counter-strategy driven by a human

rights approach as its central pillar, would be an efficient way of dealing with radicalization.

5. Family values and radicalization

Many Muslim families are aware that Islamic teachings can disrupt any society. They also know harming any living person is considered a grave sin. Therefore any acts of terror is not condoned by Islam. Muslims believe that Islam is a peaceful religion thus any support given to the radicalization of youth is a contradiction of the Islamic faith. During the focus group discussion the youth were asked whether they knew friends who had joined any extremist group. The unanimous answer was that they did not know anyone who had joined rebel groups but they had heard from people. 'There might be some who are not in our bracket of friends but from our circle there were no youth joining extremist groups nor Al Shabaab'. It emerged from the discussion that the youth were not for the idea of joining extremist groups. They did not agree with the ideologies presented and found them baseless for joining extremist groups. A stable family that promotes good social values had a positive impact on the youth.

Therefore, most of the focus youths argued that those who became radicalized cite peer groups, radicalized religious institutions as push factors. They agreed that to stop youth from radicalization there is the need to create more job opportunities, reduce ignorance in the society by creating awareness. According to Hassan (2012), *Push factors* cover a wide range of issues like unemployment, break down of family values due to globalization influencing behavior of the youth¹⁴. Hassan (2012) shows that al-Shabab paid well (\$50-\$150 monthly, depending on the employment offered. However, the Eastleigh youth joining extremist groups for money was very simplistic because some of the youth who have been radicalized tend to be well off financially through wage and self-employment.

De-Radicalization mechanisms

The place of families in radicalization and de-radicalisation

McCauley and Moskaleiko also distinguish between individual radicalisation mechanisms, group mechanisms and mass mechanisms. They argue that direct individual grievances and indirect political frustration lead to radicalism, particularly when an individual identifies with a persecuted in-group. They also refer to the 'slippery slope' factor, i.e. an increase

¹⁴ *Muhsin Hassan*, Understanding Drivers of Violent Extremism: The Case of al-Shabab and Somali Youth, writing in the CTC Sentinel, 2012.

in radical intensity after one joins a radical group. Like other researchers, McCauley and Moskaleiko also stress the influence of family and friends in radicalisation, principally that they minimise the risk of an individual becoming a radical. A desire for improved status, thrill and 'unfreezing' (a quest for belonging and integration after a loss of family, career etc.) also contribute to radicalization.....

The relation between radicalization and Migration

The youth from Eastleigh were not convinced there was a strong relationship between radicalization and migration. This is because the Eastleigh youth interviewed were mostly from Somalia. Buttheybahd found integration working well in Eastleigh because of their family values and upbringing.The context of this study was strengthened by returning youth from terror activities abroad. It raised the perspective that defining radicalization from the view of the individual and their motivation, rather than the overused narrative of the external factors attributed to radicalization by religious leaders would be best approach(Kundhani,2014). The psychologists have also tried to digest the motivation factors and divided them into internal and external causes.

Discussion from the data and solutions

The UN General Assembly Plenary on September 21st 2017 unanimously agreed that youth radicalisation towards violent extremism has become a global phenomenon that threatens peace, security and stability(UN,2017).However what was not covered at the UN General Assembly was the different environments through which youth radicalization was occurring. This study has underscored the importance of families in contributing positively or negatively to radicalization. It has established that there are many drivers of radicalization. They are summed up as pull and push factors.

However, four of them stand out in the radicalization process. These are migration in general for greener pastures, refugees, political self determination and foreign invasion resistance. In order to reduce radicalization leading to terrorism there have emerged models that reflect on the conversion model. Rambo (1993) and Farrall (2015) models brought out key elements of conversion to a new reality (faith) rather than joining a religious-political ideology. For de-radicalisation to occur we have established the drivers as the desire for improved status, thrill and 'unfreezing' a quest for belonging. This is achieved better through the integration after a loss of family and when an individual identifies with a persecuted in-group. The slippery slope models by McCauley and Moskaleiko help to understand why youth could join terror networks but soon after find start finding a way out of it.

The model looks at increase in radical intensity after one joins a radical group, while at the same time finding an entry point to de-radicalise the youth.

IN the findings, the youth in Eastleigh were aware of the role their families can play in helping the youth find meaning in life than joining terror groups. It also established that migration can be turned into a good rather than an evil. The migrants need to be helped to join the economic culture of the respective country they enter.

CONCLUSION

By Olga Aristeidou, International Relations Expert

The findings show that radicalization is one of the most controversial terms in the field of social and political sciences. It is usually used to describe the causes of homegrown terrorism, a phenomenon characterized by the fact that terrorists are born and/or grown up in the country which they plot to attack.[i] While for some analysts radicalization does not exist as a phenomenon, others believe that it cannot offer useful explanation for terrorism. Nevertheless, radicalization has been at the heart of policy agendas in many countries for the last decade. The skepticism of many academics arises from the fact that radicalization seems to be more a political than a scientific term.[ii] Thus, we argue that it is not a satisfactory explanation of terrorism, as it offers an over-simplified description and it tends to focus only on Muslims, ergo being quite a racist explanation.

The dominant literature on radicalization has been very Eurocentric and pro the west. This simple study has raised fundamental causes of radicalization and removed the stigma that Islam is to blame. Every community that feels marginalized and disillusioned by the dominance of a particular group in society can push one into radicalization and extremism. High level of education did not necessarily stem radicalization in such situations. The level of radicalization caused by migrating communities across borders and continents fuels radicalization especially when denied the opportunity to stay. Migration of people is a human phenomenon that requires tolerance and understanding. Some of these pull and push factors are economic but some are caused by the natural phenomena i.e floods, earthquakes and plagues can cause people to migrate. Should society deny people freedom of movement to safer places? Great humility and tolerance can help control radicalization and bring sanity into society. Radicalization can also be fueled by the interests of businessmen by giving them arms to protect their enterprises. The youth will tend to pledge allegiance to their own clan members rather than question the right motive behind the feud about the nature of business. Seth Schwartz (2009) made a

strong case why terrorism represents a confluence of cultural, social, and personal identity in society.

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